







Working Paper No. 8 – January 2008 
 
 
THE PHENOMENON OF MULTILEVEL REGULATION: INTERACTIONS 
BETWEEN GLOBAL, EU AND NATIONAL REGULATORY SPHERES 
TOWARDS A RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
 










   
THE PHENOMENON OF MULTILEVEL REGULATION: INTERACTIONS 
BETWEEN GLOBAL, EU AND NATIONAL REGULATORY SPHERES 
TOWARDS A RESEARCH AGENDA 
 




Rules are no longer merely made by states, but increasingly by international 
organizations and other international bodies. At the same time these 
rules do impact the daily life of citizens and companies as it has become increasingly 
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agenda for further research, including legal and non-legal approaches. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past decade globalisation and global governance have become central 
themes, not just in international relations and politics, but also in the study of 
international and national law. The reason may well be, as some observers hold, that 
“central pillars of the international legal order are seen from a classical perspective 
as increasingly challenged: the distinction between domestic and international law 
becomes more precarious, soft forms of rule-making are ever more widespread, the 
sovereign equality of states is gradually undermined, and the basis of legitimacy of 
international law is increasingly in doubt.”1 Indeed, many of these themes feature in 
current research programmes. Domestic legal systems – traditionally by definition 
caught in national logic – increasingly recognise the influence of international and 
transnational regulation and law-making on their development.2 Legal scholars 
attempt to cope with the proliferation of international organisations and other entities 
contributing to extra-national normative processes.3  
  
While the notion and consequences of globalisation are the subject of debate, 
common denominators seem at least to include a profound transformation of the 
traditional Nation State and the inability of sovereignty to protect the State against 
foreign interference.4 The proliferation of international organisations5 and the 
expansion of international law as well as the related need for national legal systems 
to implement ever more international rules are commonly considered to go hand in 
hand with globalisation.6 Apart from challenging some of the foundations of 
international law, globalisation raises questions in particular about to the negative 
effects it may have on the rule of law, democracy and legitimacy (infra, 4.1.).  
                                                 
1  N. Krisch and B. Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law 
in the International Legal Order’, EJIL, Vol. 1 2006, pp. 1-13, at p. 1. 
2  For an analysis of the main trends see the research programme of the Hague Institute for the 
Internationalisation of Law (HiiL): http://www.hiil.org.. 
3  See K. Jayasuriya, ‘Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence 
of Global Regulatory Governance’, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 2 1999, pp. 
425-255. In his book International Organizations as Law-makers (Oxford University Press, 
2005) José Alvarez reveals that the role of international organisations in law-making not only 
increased, but also that international law is not always well enough equipped to handle this 
development. Cf. also D. Sarooshi, International Organizations and their Exercise of Sovereign 
Powers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. See earlier in particular J. Delbrück (ed.), New 
Trends in International Lawmaking – International ‘Legislation’ in the Public Interest, Berlin: 
Ducker & Humblot, 1996; on the development of the (sub-) discipline of the law of international 
organisations in general, see J. Klabbers, ‘The Life and Times of the Law of International 
Organizations’, Nordic Journal of International Law, 2001, pp. 287-317. 
4  A. von Bogdandy, ‘Globalization and Europe: How to Square Democracy, Globalization and 
International Law’, EJIL, Vol. 5 2004, pp. 885-906 at pp. 886-887. 
5  On this phenomenon see N.M. Blokker and H.G. Schermers, (eds.), Proliferation of International 
Organizations, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001. 
6  A. von Bogdandy, supra, p. 889. 
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The interactions between national and international legal spheres, including the 
European legal sphere for EU Member States, have intensified and gained increased 
visibility over the last few years. It is becoming ever more difficult to draw dividing 
lines between legal orders: international law is increasingly coming to play a role in 
national (and EU) legal orders, whereas national (and EU) legal developments are 
exerting a bottom-up influence on the evolution of the international legal order.7 In 
political science and public administration, the phenomenon of interacting and partly 
overlapping policy spheres is often referred to as multilevel governance. Two 
dimensions of this concept are particularly relevant to the present contribution. The 
first one, ‘governance without government’, points to the phenomenon that a number 
of public tasks are increasingly assumed and carried out by actors other than the 
classical government institutions of the Nation State (and its subdivisions).8 The 
second dimension, ‘governance beyond the State’, refers to the complexity of 
governance at distinct but increasingly intertwined levels. ‘Multilevel’ then refers to a 
variety of forms of decision making, authority, policy making, regulation, 
organisation, ruling, steering, etcetera, characterized by a complex interweaving of 
actors operating at different levels of formal jurisdictional or administrative authority, 
ranging from the local level, via the national level, to the macro-regional and global 
level.9 These phenomena involve important questions concerning the location of 
power, the sharing of responsibility, the legitimacy of decisions and decision takers, 
and the accountability to citizens and organisations in different national, sub-national 
and international settings. From a legal perspective, the interactions between global, 
European and national regulatory spheres lead to what one could refer to as the 
phenomenon of ‘multilevel regulation’.10 We understand ‘regulation’ in a broad sense 
                                                 
7  On the phenomenon of what can be cautiously referred to as a new ‘Europeanisation’ of 
international law, see J. Wouters, A. Nollkaemper, and E. de Wet, (eds.), The Europeanisation of 
International Law: The Status of International Law in the EU and Member States, The Hague: 
T.M C. Asser Press, 2008 (forthcoming). 
8  See for instance O. Treib, H. Bähr and G. Falkner, ‘Modes of Governance: A Note Towards 
Conceptual Clarification’, European Governance Papers, No. N-05-02, 17 November 2005, 
available at http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-newgov-N-05-02.pdf. 
9  A classic is L. Hooghe and G. Marks, Multi-level Governance and European Integration, 
Lanham, MD: Rowan & Little Field Publishers, 2001. In legal academic circles the notion has 
been picked up and applied, inter alia, by N. Bernard, Multilevel Governance in the European 
Union, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002. 
10  See R.A. Wessel, The Invasion by International Organizations. De toenemende samenhang 
tussen de mondiale, Europese en nationale rechtsorde [The Increasing Interrelatedness between 
Global, European and National Legal Orders], Inaugural Lecture, University of Twente, 12 
January 2006, p. 26, available at 
http://www.mb.utwente.nl/ces/research/other_publications_including_i/oratiewessel.pdf. The 
term, however, is quite common in biochemics, see for instance I. Olson, et al., ‘Multilevel 
Regulation of Lysosomal Gene Expression in Lymphocytes‘, Biochemical and Biophysical 
Research Comunications, 1993, pp. 327-335; or V. Oke and R. Losick, ‘Multilevel Regulation of 
the Sporulation Transcription Factor σK in Bacillus subtilis‘, Journal of Bacteriology, 1993, 
pp. 7341-7347. 
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here, referring to the setting of rules, standards or principles that govern conduct by 
public and/or private actors. Whereas ‘rules’ are the most constraining and rigid, 
‘standards’ leave a greater range of choice or discretion, while ‘principles’ are still 
more flexible, leaving scope to balance a number of (policy) considerations.  
 
The purpose of the present contribution is to introduce and further analyse this 
relatively new phenomenon. We examine two questions: what are indications of 
interactions between normative processes at global, European and national level11; 
and what consequences do these interactions have for the research agenda related 
to the further development of the global and European legal order? In section 2 we 
first of all attempt to map and further define the phenomenon of multilevel regulation. 
This is followed in section 3 by an analysis of the responses from the legal 
community to this phenomenon. In section 4 we try to set out an agenda for further 
research, including legal and non-legal approaches.  
 
2. THE PHENOMENON OF MULTILEVEL REGULATION 
2.1. The Invasion of International Organisations 
 
International organisations and international regimes are increasingly engaged in 
normative processes which, de jure or de facto, impact on States and even on 
individuals and businesses.12 Since decisions of international organisations are 
increasingly coming to be considered a source of international law13, it is quite 
common to regard them in terms of international regulation or legislation. Whereas 
regulation, as stated above, is the more comprehensive term used in this 
contribution, ‘legislation’ has a more narrow connotation as ‘legislative power’ has 
been said to have three characteristics: (1) a written articulation of rules that (2) have 
legally binding effect as such and (3) have been promulgated by a process to which 
express authority has been delegated a priori to make binding rules without 
affirmative a posteriori assent to those rules by those bound.14 An even more 
                                                 
11  We largely leave out the more direct bi- or multilateral (transnational) relations between States. 
For an interesting theoretical analysis of the interdependence of regulatory policies of different 
countries see D. Lazer, ‘Global and Domestic Governance: Modes of Interdependence in 
Regulatory Policymaking’, ELJ, 2006, pp. 455-468. 
12  See the contributions in Follesdal, Wessel and Wouters (eds.), op.cit. 
13  See also I.F. Dekker and R.A. Wessel, ‘Governance by International Organisations: Rethinking 
the Source and Normative Force of International Decisions’, in: I.F. Dekker and W. Werner, 
(eds.), Governance and International Legal Theory, Leiden/ Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2004, pp. 215-236. 
14  B. Oxman, ‘The International Commons, the International Public Interest and New Modes of 
International Lawmaking’, in J. Delbrück, (ed.), New Trends in International Lawmaking – 
International Legislation in the Public Interest, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996, pp. 21-60 at 
pp. 28-30. Cf. also T. Stein, ‘Comment’ in Delbrück, op.cit., pp. 212-213. C. Schreuder 
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distinguishing element, perhaps, is that such rules imply future application to an 
indeterminate number of cases and situations.15  
 
It is undisputed that international organisations may take binding decisions vis-à-vis 
their Member States and that they may even exercise sovereign powers, including 
executive, legislative and judicial powers.16 Thus, apart from the EC and the UN17, 
organisations with a competence to take legally binding decisions include the World 
Health Assembly of the WHO, the Council of the ICAO, the OAS, the WEU, NATO, 
OECD, UPU, WMO and IMF.18 As Alvarez notes, more and more technocratic 
international organisations “appear to be engaging in legislative or regulatory activity 
in ways and for reasons that might be more readily explained by students of 
bureaucracy than by scholars of the traditional forms for making customary law or 
engaging in treaty-making. They also often engage in law-making by subterfuge.”19 
Thus, Alvarez’s survey includes standard setting by the IMO, the FAO, the ICAO, the 
ILO, the IAEA, UNEP, the World Bank, and the IMF. In addition, many international 
conventions – including UNCLOS (on the law of the sea) and a number of WTO 
agreements – incorporate generally accepted international “rules, standards, 
regulations, procedures and/or practices” (UNCLOS).20 Alvarez points to the fact that 
this may effectively transform a number of codes, guidelines and standards created 
by international organisations and bodies into binding norms. Indeed, while in most 
cases standard setting is accomplished through softer modes of regulation, this may 
leave the subjects of regulation “with as little effective choice as some Security 
Council enforcement actions”.21 Nevertheless, most types of law making by 
international organisations are generally directed towards the organisation’s own 
                                                                                                                                           
(‘Comment’ in ibid., pp. 213-215) points to the establishment by the Security Council of criminal 
tribunals as a sign of international legislation. 
15  A.J.J. de Hoogh, ‘Attribution or Delegation of (Legislative) Power by the Security Council?’, in: 
M. Bothe and B. Kondoch, (eds.), The Yearbook of International Peace Operations, Vol. 7 2001, 
pp. 1-41, at p. 27. Cf. T. Stein, ‘Comment’ in Delbrück (see supra n. 13),  pp. 212-213. 
16  See quite extensively on this issue D. Sarooshi (see supra n. 3). 
17  On decisions of the EU see e.g. A. von Bogdandy, F. Arndt and J. Bast, ‘Legal Instruments in 
European Union Law and their Reform: A Systematic Approach on an Empirical Basis’, 
Yearbook of European Law 2004, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 91-136. 
18  Cf. P.J. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2001;  H.J. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity within 
Diversity, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003; J. Klabbers, An Introduction to 
International Institutional Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; C.F. 
Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005; and N.D. White, The Law of International Organisations, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005. 
19  J.E. Alvarez (see supra 3), p. 217. 
20  Ibid, Chapter 4. 
21  Ibid., at p. 218. 
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members, viz., States.22 But what if decisions by international organisations either de 
jure or de facto become part of the domestic legal order of the Member States and 
directly or indirectly affect citizens and/or businesses within those States? 
  
While in most States the decisions of international organisations and bodies typically 
require implementation in the domestic legal order before they become valid legal 
norms, the density of the global governance web has caused an interplay between 
the normative processes at various levels. For EU Member States (and their citizens) 
this can imply that the substantive origin of EU decisions (which usually enjoy direct 
effect in, and supremacy over the domestic legal order) is to be found in another 
international body.23 In many areas, ranging from security to food safety, banking, 
health issues or the protection of the environment, national rules find their basis in 
international and/or European decisions. In those cases decisions may enter the 
domestic legal orders as part of European law. But international decisions may also 
have an independent impact on domestic legal orders. This is not to say that 
international decisions have a direct effect in the sense we are familiar with in EU 
law. From the point of view of international law, while “primacy is a matter of logic as 
international law can only assume its role of stabilizing a global legal order if it 
supersedes particular and local rules”, at the same time it “allows for an undefined 
variety of combinations based either upon the doctrine of monism or the doctrine of 
dualism”.24 However, the fact that many domestic legal orders do not allow their 
citizens to directly invoke international norms before national courts25 does not mean 
that these norms are devoid of impact. As the norms are usually based on 
international agreements and/or decisions of international organisations, States will 
simply have to follow the rules of the game in their international dealings. This 
implies that even domestically they may have to adjust to ensure that the rules are 
observed by all parts of the administration. The de facto impact of the – often quite 
                                                 
22  A number of international organisations also contain other international organisations as 
members: for instance, the WTO has the European Community as one of its founding members. 
23  For a recent survey of the relations between the EU and other international organisations see: F. 
Hoffmeister, ‘Outsider or Frontrunner? Recent Developments under International and European 
Law on the Status of the European Union in International Organizations and Treaty Bodies’, 
CMLRev., Vol. 44 2007, pp. 41-68. 
24  Th. Cottier, ‘A Theory of Direct Effect in Global Law’, in: A. von Bogdandy, et. al., (eds.), 
European Integration and International Co-ordination: Studies in Transnational Economic Law 
in honour of Claus Dieter Ehlermann, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001, pp. 99-123 at 
p. 102 and p. 104. 
25  For a recent survey of the different legal systems in Europe see: A. von Bogdandy, P.M. Huber 
and P. Cruz Villalón, (eds.), Ius Publicum Europaeum; Band I: Staatliches Verfassungsrecht im 
Europäischen Rechtsraum, Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Verlag, 2007. 
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technical – norms and the need for consistent interpretation26 may thus set aside 
more sophisticated notions of the applicability of international norms in the domestic 
legal order.  
 
The United Nations Security Council forms a good example of an international body 
that is increasingly active in the creation of ‘international regulation’ or ‘international 
legislation’, although its legal competence to engage in these activities has been 
questioned.27 Thus, in the area of anti-terrorism measures for example, Security 
Council Resolution 1390 (2002) was no longer directed at the Taliban regime but at 
individuals (Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the persons and entities 
associated with them). In that respect the resolution seems to herald a new 
development, as any connection with the territory of a State is omitted. Perhaps 
Resolution 1373 (2001) already pointed to something new when, in reaction to the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September, the Council determined “that such acts, like any 
act of international terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security”, 
thus referring to terrorist acts in the abstract. The Council then imposed on all States 
duties to “prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts”, inter alia by 
criminalising conduct aimed at financing or supporting terrorist acts. 
 
Whereas its Charter presents the United Nations as an intergovernmental 
organisation dealing with the relations between its Member States (compare Arts. 1 
and 2), taking decisions that entail obligations on those Member States (Art. 25), and 
extremely hesitant to interfere in the domestic jurisdiction of any State, the Security 
Council recently took a number of decisions that directly affect citizens within 
Member States. Key examples include the establishment of the Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, the cases in which the UN has taken over the 
                                                 
26  Ibid. on the impact of the doctrine of consistent interpretation in relation to the domestic effect of 
WTO law, pp. 109-110. 
27  A.J.J. de Hoogh, ‘Attribution or Delegation of (Legislative) Power by the Security Council?’, in: 
M. Bothe and B. Kondoch, (eds.), International Peacekeeping. The Yearbook of International 
Peace Operations, Vol. 7 2001, pp. 1-41; and B. Eberling, ‘The Ultra vires Character of 
Legislative Action by the Security Council’, International Organizations Law Review, 2005, pp. 
337-360. This development is often addressed to question the competence of the Security 
Council in this respect. See also recently: M. Akram and S.H. Shah, ‘The Legislative Powers of 
the United Nations Security Council’; and A. Marschik, ‘Legislative Powers of the Security 
Council’, both in: R.S. MacDonald and D.M. Johnston, (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism: 
Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2005; S. Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislator’, American Journal of International 
Law, 2005, pp. 175-193; and E. de Wet, ‘The Security Council as a Law-Maker: The Adoption of 
(Quasi)-Legislative Decisions’, in: R. Wolfrum and V. Röben, (eds.), Developments of 
International Law in Treaty Making, Berlin: Springer, 2005, pp. 184-225. The debate is 
somewhat older; see for instance E. Yemin, Legislative Powers in the United Nations and 
Specialised Agencies, Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1996; and F.L. Kirgis, ‘The Security Council’s First 
Fifty Years’, American Journal of International Law, 1995, p. 520. 
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interim administration of a region or State (UNMIK in Kosovo and UNTAET in Timor 
Leste)28 and the replacement of traditional sanctions directed at States (e.g. Iraq) by 
‘smart sanctions’ directed at certain individuals or groups.29 Thus the Security 
Council placed greater emphasis on its ability to take decisions with a great impact 
on intra-state issues rather than being involved merely in relations between States. 
Of course, even this development is not entirely new. By now we are used to the 
Council’s occasional determination of (the effects of) domestic conflicts as threats to 
(international) peace and security. Moreover, the discussion on military intervention 
for humanitarian reasons highlighted the possible (and in the eyes of some even 
necessary) role of the Security Council in this area.30 In this sense it could be argued 
that the Security Council is no longer dealing with a particular situation between 
States or within a State, but with a more abstract situation that does not involve a 
particular dispute. Another example of an abstract danger could be Resolution 1422 
(2002). By exempting certain “acts or omissions relating to a United Nations 
established or authorized operation” from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court, even though no ICC investigation was imminent, the Council in effect held the 
                                                 
28  For example, in relation to UNTAET, SC Resolution 1271 (1999) provides in para. 1 that 
UNTAET “[…] will be endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of east Timor 
and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the 
administration of justice […].” See also C. Stahn, ‘Governance beyond the State: Issues of 
Legitimacy in International Territorial Administration’, International Organizations Law Review, 
2005, pp. 9-56; B. Kondoch, ‘The United Nations Administration of East Timor’, Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 2 2001, pp. 245-265; and R. Wilde, ‘Representing Territorial 
Administration: A Critique of Some Approaches’, EJIL, 2004, pp. 71-96. 
29  Smart sanctions are also referred to as ‘targeted’ or ‘designer’ sanctions. While the 
Afghanistan/Al-Qaeda sanctions renewed academic attention to this issue, comparable smart 
sanctions were for instance already established by Res. 1127 (1997) and 1173 and 1176 (1998) 
against UNITA (Angola); by Res. 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone; Res. 1160 (1998) 
concerning Kosovo; Res. 1298 (2000) concerning Eritrea and Ethiopia; and by Res. 1343 (2001) 
concerning Liberia. More extensively see: I. Cameron, ‘Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards 
and the European Convention on Human Rights’, Nordic Journal of International Law, 2003, pp. 
159-214; R.A. Wessel, ‘Debating the ‘Smartness’ of Anti-Terrorism Sanctions: The UN Security 
Council and the Individual Citizen’, in: C. Fijnaut, J. Wouters and F. Naert (eds.), Legal 
Instruments in the Fight Against International Terrorism. A Transatlantic Dialogue, Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004, pp. 633-660. On the sanctions committees dealing with the 
cases see: G.L. Burci, ‘Interpreting the Humanitarian Exceptions Through the Sanctions 
Committees’, in: V. Gowlland-Debbas, (ed.), United Nations Sanctions and International Law, 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001, pp. 143-154, at pp. 144-145. 
30  For a survey of Security Council activities in this area see: I. Österdahl, ‘The Exception as the 
Rule: Lawmaking on Force and Human Rights by the UN Security Council’, Journal of Conflict 
& Security Law, 2005, pp. 1-20. Earlier: B. Graefrath, ‘Leave to the Court What Belongs to the 
Court: The Libyan Case’, European Journal of International Law, 1993, p. 184; M. Bedjaoui, 
The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of its Acts, Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994; J.E. Alvarez, ‘Judging the Security Council’, American 
Journal of International Law, 1996, pp. 1-39; D.W. Bowett, ‘The Court’s Role in Relation to 
International Organisations’, in: V. Lowe and M. Fitzmaurice, (eds.), Fifty Years of the 
International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, pp. 181-192; and J. Dugard, ‘Judicial Review of Sanctions’, in: V. 
Gowlland-Debbas, United Nations Sanctions and International Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2001, pp. 83-91. 
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abstract possibility of such an investigation to be a threat to peace. A particularly 
clear example is Resolution 1540 (2004), in which the Council again identified an 
abstract danger – the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State 
actors – as a threat to peace, and it again laid down a general obligation on all 
States that they shall refrain from assisting non-State actors in acquiring weapons of 
mass destruction, to criminalise the behaviour of non-State actors aimed at acquiring 
such weapons, etc.31 Earlier examples of resolutions attempting to ‘regulate’ a 
certain area without any relation to a specific conflict include the protection of 
civilians in armed conflicts and the spread of HIV/AIDS, as well as certain methods 
employed by terrorist groups. However, in this context the Council had not (yet) 
invoked its Chapter VII powers to lay down binding norms.32  
  
The World Trade Organization is another body whose decisions have been labelled 
international regulation.33 While one may debate whether the decisions taken by the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) are to been seen as proof of the 
organisation’s ‘legislative’ or ‘adjudicative’ powers, the fact remains that they reach 
beyond the WTO Members involved in the dispute and may even have serious 
consequences for individuals (including enterprises in particular).34 A similar 
phenomenon may be discovered in another dimension of the WTO: intellectual 
property, regulated in the so-called TRIPs,35 which may affect the producers of 
HIV/AIDS medicines, in that an international decision ensures that their products 
may be sold under the market value in developing countries. Apart from the fact that 
the WTO has no facilities for individual access to a judicial review procedure such as 
those applicable within the EU, it may nevertheless find itself bound by Security 
Council resolutions, which may have a conclusive impact on the outcome of a WTO 
dispute settlement procedure. 
  
                                                 
31  B. Eberling, (see supra n. 26), pp. 337-360. On ‘abstract’ or ‘thematic’ decisions see also : C. 
Denis, Le Pouvoir normatif du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies: Portée et limites, Brussels : 
Bruylant, 2004, paras. 118–130 en paras. 171–181; as well as J.E. Alvarez, (see supra n. 3), 
2005, pp. 173–176. 
32  B. Eberling, (see supra n. 30). 
33  See in particular N. Lavranos: Decisions of International Organizations in the European and 
Domestic Legal Orders of Selected EU Member States, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 
2004. 
34  This forms one of the reasons for the debate on the constitutionalisation of trade law. See for 
instance D.Z. Cass, ‘The “Constitutionalization” of Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the 
Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade’, European Journal of International 
Law, 2001, pp. 39-75; as well as Cass, op.cit., 2005. On the impact of the WTO on the 
international legal order see the interesting book by J.H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and the 
Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
35  On TRIPs see e.g. S.K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
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Other examples of international regulation can be found with the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (in relation to the fixing of  standards regarding the 
establishment of a refugee status of the governance of refugee camps), the World 
Health Organization (in establishing global health risks), the so-called Financial 
Action Task Force of the OECD (in the area of money laundering), WIPO (in the area 
of intellectual property) and the World Bank (in setting criteria for obtaining financial 
support).  
 
International norms do not always reach States’ domestic legal order directly: they 
may have followed a route through other international bodies. In the European Union 
the relation between EU decisions and decisions taken by other international bodies 
is indeed quite obvious.36 Whereas this has been particularly apparent in the area 
covered by the internal market, the Union recently made clear that there is also an 
interplay between its decisions and United Nations anti-terrorism measures. In the 
Yusuf and Kadi cases, citizens of the Union did not succeed in having their names 
removed from UN and EU sanctions lists.37 The Member State in question (Sweden) 
was faced with the supremacy of EU law, whereas the European Court of First 
Instance held that the European Community is bound by UN law and the Court was 
in no position to judge the legality of UN Security Council Resolutions. At the same 
time the relationship between the European Community and the WTO may be 
regarded from a multilevel perspective. While the WTO is in no way comparable to 
the UN where questions of hierarchy and primacy are concerned, the ECJ has 
indicated the necessity that Community law be interpreted in conformity with WTO 
law. In that sense similar arguments to those used by the Court of First Instance in 
the Yusuf and Kadi cases could appear  in cases where individuals claim to be a 
victim of a WTO (DSB) decision, in which case they would add to the already difficult 
position of individuals under WTO law.38
  
There thus seems to be a need to investigate the interplay between regulatory 
powers of international organisations.39 The close relationship between norms 
                                                 
36  See also Hoffmeister (see supra n. 22). 
37  CFI Cases T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and 
Commission; and T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission, 21 September 
2005. See also R.A. Wessel, ‘The UN, the EU and Jus Cogens’, International Organizations Law 
Review, 2006, No.1, pp. 1-6. 
38  So far the direct effect of WTO law has not been accepted by the European Court of Justice. See 
for instance Case C-149/96, Portugal/Council. For examples in the area of international trade see: 
S. Shapiro, ‘International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection and Public Accountability’, 
Administrative Law Review, 2002, p. 435. 
39  For a theoretical approach to regulatory interaction see also: V. Mayer-Schönberger and A. 
Somek, ‘Introduction: Governing Regulatory Interaction: the Normative Question’, ELJ, 2006, 
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enacted by the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization and the 
European Union, for instance, is quite obvious.40 The new International Health 
Regulations (IHR) as well as the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC) may be seen as examples. One could also point to the International Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, a subsidiary common body of FAO and WHO which 
develops international standards on food safety. It cannot be denied that – in 
particular through the WTO’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards41 
– these standards have an effect in other legal orders, including in those of the EU 
and its Member States. The fact that the European Community has been a Member 
of the Codex Alimentarius Commission since 200342 reinforces the multilevel nature 
of this field of regulation.43 Similar examples may be found in the area of 
environmental protection, where international standards are set that are not only 
binding on States but also on the European Community and which – in any case 
through the latter – are also relevant to individuals. Heldeweg points to some 
examples in the area of tradable allowances.44 Regulation 2037/2000 on substances 
that deplete the ozone layer,45 implementing the Vienna Convention and Montreal 
Protocol46, contains a system of trade through licences to import or export controlled 
substances from other countries (which may or may not be parties to the Montreal 
Protocol). More important, and certainly more innovative, may be the Directive 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community.47 This scheme precedes the obligations under the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) and aims to prepare the Community for 
                                                                                                                                           
pp. 431-439 (Special issue of the ELJ Governing Regulatory Interaction: the Normative 
Question). 
40   J. Wouters and B. De Meester, ‘Safeguarding Coherence in Global Policy-Making on Trade and 
Health: The Triangle WHO – WTO – EU’, International Organizations Law Review, 2005; and 
N. Lavranos, (see supra n. 32). On the influence of the EU on other international organisations 
see: L. Azoulai, ‘The Acquis of the European Union and International Organisations’, ELJ, 2005, 
pp. 196-331. The direct effect of WTO decisions in European Community law is still rejected by 
the European Court, as confirmed in such cases as C-377/02, Van Parys, 1 March 2005 and T-
19/01, Chiquita, 3 February 2005. On this topic see: P. Eeckhout, ‘Does Europe’s Constitution 
Stop at the Water’s Edge? Law and Policy in the EU’s External Relations’, Walter van Gerven 
Lectures (5), Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2005, pp. 14-17. 
41   Art.  3.4 and Annex A.3.a) SPS Agreement. 
42  Council Decision 2003/822/EC of 17 November 2003 on the accession of the European 
Community to Codex Alimentarius Commission, O.J., 2003, L309/14. See F. Hoffmeister, (see 
supra n. 22), at p. 44. 
43  Cf. also B.M.J. van der Meulen and A.A. Freriks, ‘Millefeuille – The Emergence of a Multi-
Layered Controls System in the European Food Sector’, Utrecht Law Review, 2006, pp. 156-176, 
available at  http://www.utrechtlawreview.org 
44 M.A. Heldeweg, ‘Good Environmental Governance in the EU: Lessons from Work in Progress’, 
in: D.M. Curtin and R.A. Wessel, Good Governance and the European Union: Some Reflections 
of Concepts, Institutions and Substance, Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2004, pp. 175-214. 
45 OJ L 244/1, 2000. 
46 OJ L 297/10, 1988 (Vienna Convention) and  OJ L 299/21, 1988 (Montreal Protocol). 
47 Directive 2003/87 (2003) OJ L 275. 
 12  
allowances trading. Finally, the effects on individuals are particularly evident in the 
framework of the so-called ‘Aarhus regime’. The Aarhus Convention48 is an important 
multilateral environmental treaty to which the Community is a signatory and which is 
underpinned by three basic legal requirements in the area of openness and 
participation: a) access to environmental information; b) public participation; c) 
access to judicial review in environmental cases. Each of these requirements, also 
referred to as the ‘Aarhus pillars’, has given rise to legislation or proposals based 
thereon. In other cases, too, the EC is a party to international environmental 
treaties49, or is involved in their implementation on behalf of EU Member States.50
 
2.2. The Expansion of Regulation: from Government to Governance 
 
In their interdisciplinary survey of research on regulation, Baldwin, Scott and Hood 
developed three definitions of regulation.51 In the first, most stringent definition, 
regulation refers to the promulgation of an authoritative set of standards and rules 
accompanied by some mechanism for promoting and monitoring compliance with 
these rules and standards. A second, broader definition refers to all the efforts of 
State agencies to steer individual and organisational behaviour. This approach takes 
account of other policy instruments which a State may use to influence behaviour, 
such as taxation, disclosure requirements, procurement policies, etc. A third 
approach to regulation considers all mechanisms of social control, including non-
State processes. In recent times, in addition to the standard setting practice of 
international organisations referred to above, it is especially this third type, with new 
forms of social or ‘privatised’ regulation that is on the rise and is even proliferating. 
This evolution is taking place in a context of trends such as the weakening of 
national governments, the rise and professionalisation of multinational corporations 
and supply chains, and the proliferation, diversification and internationalisation of 
                                                 
48 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters, signed by the EC on the 25th of June 1998; COM(1998) 344 
final. 
49  R.A.J. van Gestel and J.M. Verschuuren, ‘Internationaal en Europees milieurecht in Nederland? 
Gewoon toepassen!’ [International and European Environmental Law in the Netherlands? Just 
apply it!], SEW, 2005, pp. 244-251.  The authors refer to the Treaty of Basel, the UN/ECE Treaty 
of Helsinki, the Kyoto Protocol of the UN Climate Treaty, the Treaty of Bern, and the 2001 
UNEP Treaty on POP’s. See Basel: http://www.basel.int/text/text.html; Helsinki: 
http://www.unece.org/env/water/welcome.html; Kyoto: http://unfccc.int/2860.php; Bern: 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/104.htm; Aarhus: 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/; POP: http://www.pops.int/; CITES: http://www.cites.org/ 
50  See for instance the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES). 
51  R. Baldwin, C. Scott and C. Hood, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-55, in: R. Baldwin, et. al., (eds.) A 
Reader on Regulation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 3-4. 
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new social movements and their strategies.52 This shift is often referred to as a shift 
from government to governance in regard to policy making. 
 
Traditionally, social problems or public policy issues were governed by States via a 
regulatory framework consisting of bureaucracies (departments, ministries) and 
legislation. This top-down, command-and-control approach aimed at setting and 
implementing standards which are/were applicable to all parties involved in the same 
way. From the 1980s on, though, the deficiencies of this  
approach started to emerge in both old and new policy fields,53 leading to the 
development of new policy instruments and arrangements. A major policy shift 
constitutes a move away from the State as the sole actor in policy making. The State 
traditionally acted in a top-down, command-and-control fashion. However, apart from 
an increasing role of international organisations and bodies (supra, 2.1.), new modes 
of policy making are characterised by a greater role for private actors, either via 
intensive negotiation, consultation, interaction, and even self-regulation, or via 
increasing economic and market-oriented strategies and instruments.54 This 
broadening of the ‘spectre of intervention’ implies a fundamental redefinition of the 
role of the State55: the State should no longer row but steer56, focus more on means 
                                                 
52  T. Bartley, ‘Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the Rise of Private 
Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields’, Politics and Society, Vol. 31(3) 2003, pp. 
433-464; B. Cashore, “Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How 
Non-state Market-driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-making Authority”, in: 
Governance – An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 15(4) 2003, pp. 503-
529; D. O’Rourke, ‘Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor 
Standards and Monitoring’, Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 31(1) 2003, pp. 1-29; A. Fung, ‘Making 
Social Markets: Dispersed Governance and Corporate Accountability’ in: John D. Donahue and 
Joseph S. Nye, (eds.), Market Based Governance, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2003; G. Gereffi, et al., The NGO-industrial complex, Foreign Policy, Vol. 125 2001, pp.  56-65; 
C. Sabel, ‘Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development’, pp. 137-165, in: 
N. Smelser and R. Swedberg, (eds.), Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994; C. Sabel, Ratcheting Labor Standards. Regulation for Continuous 
Improvement in the Global Workplace, Washington: World Bank, 2000. 
53  See inter alia M. Jänicke, State Failure – the Impotence of Politics in Industrial Society, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990. C. Crouch and D. Marquand, (eds.), Ethics and Markets. Co-
operation and Competition within Capitalist Economies, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993; J. 
van Tatenhove, et al., (eds.), Political Modernisation and the Environment. The Renewal of 
Environmental Policy Arrangements, Dordrecht : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000; A. Mol, 
‘Ecological Modernisation and Institutional Reflexivity: Environmental Reform in the Late 
Modern Age’, Environmental Politics, Vol. 5(2) 1996, pp. 302-23; M. Hajer, The Politics of 
Environmental Discourse. Ecological Modernisation and the Policy Process, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995. 
54  D. Liefferink, M.S. Anderesen and M. Eneveldsen, ‘Interpreting Joint Environmental Policy-
Making: Between Deregulation and Political Modernization’, in: A. Mol, et al., (eds.), The 
Voluntary Approach to Environmental Policy. Joint Environmental Policy-Making in Europe, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 10-31, at p. 14. 
55  D. Liefferink, et al., ‘Interpreting Joint Environmental Policy-Making: Between Deregulation and 
Political Modernization’, pp. 10-31, in: A. Mol, et al., (eds.), (see supra n. 53); M. Jänicke, State 
Failure – the Impotence of Politics in Industrial Society, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, p. 166.  
56  D. Osborne and T. Gaebler, Reinventing Government, New York: Basic Books, 1992. 
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than on ends57 and concentrate more on organisation and direction rather than 
provision.58 The new policy catchwords are bottom-up policy processes, 
empowerment, the importance of learning processes, (open methods of) co-
ordination, co-operation, consensus, flexibility, tailor-made solutions, self-regulation, 
public-private partnerships, participation and benchmarking. Tatenhove, adopting a 
European perspective, identified the following major policy changes: “"(a) the 
traditional divides between state, market and civil society are disappearing, while (b) 
the interrelations between these spheres increasingly exceed the nation state, (c) 
resulting in new coalitions between state agencies, market agents and civic parties 
both on local and global levels”.59 The overall result is a policy style characterized by 
plurality in terms of policy instruments, coalitions between parties, the allocation and 
distribution of power and new forms of co-operation. In the United States, too, legal 
scholars and political scientists describe the emergence of a new democratic model: 
“The emergent model, which we call democratic experimentalism, combines the 
virtues of localism, decentralization, and direct citizen participation with the discipline 
of national coordination, transparency, and public accountability.”60 According to 
some American scholars these new models try to combine the virtues of localism, 
decentralisation, and direct participation with the discipline of international or national 
co-ordination and public accountability.61 “In contrast to conventional hierarchical 
regulation in which subordinate private actors answer to the authoritative command 
of a central regulator, the practical core of the new model is centrally monitored local 
experimentation.”62
 
                                                 
57  D. Miliband, ‘The New Politics of Economics’, in: C. Crouch and D. Marquand, (eds.), Ethics 
and Markets. Co-operation and Competition within Capitalist Economies, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1993, pp. 21-30. 
58  G. Mulgan, ‘Reticulated Organisations: The Birth and Death of the Mixed Economy’, in: C. 
Crouch, et al., (eds.), Ethics and Markets. Co-operation and Competition within Capitalist 
Economies, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993, pp. 31-47; G. Mulgan, Politics in an 
Antipolitical Age; Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994. 
59  J. van Tatenhove, B. Arts and P. Leroy, ‘Political Modernisation’, in: J. van Tatenhove, et al., 
(eds.), Political Modernisation and the Environment. The Renewal of Environmental Policy 
Arrangements, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, pp. 35-51, at p. 48. 
60  B. Karkkainen, A. Fung and C. F. Sabel, ‘After Backyard Environmentalism. Towards a 
Performance-Based Regime of Environmental Regulation’, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 
44(4) 2000, pp. 692-711, at p. 692. 
 
61  D. Esty and D. Geradin, (eds.), Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative 
Perspectives. 2001, Oxford U.K.: Oxford University Press; B. Karkkainen, A. Fung and C. F. 
Sabel, (see supra n. 59), pp. 692-711; C. Sabel, ‘Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of 
Economic Development’, in: N. Smelser and R. Swedberg, (eds.), Handbook of Economic 
Sociology, 1994, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 137-165; C.F. Sabel, A. Fung and D. 
O’Rourke, Ratcheting Labor Standards. Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global 
Workplace, Washington: World Bank, 2000 ; M. Dorf and C.F. Sabel, ‘A Constitution of 
Democratic Experimentalism’, Columbia Law Review, March 1998, pp. 267-473. 
62  B. Karkkainen, A. Fung and C.F. Sabel, (see supra n. 59), p. 691. 
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These new forms of governance are considered superior to existing policy making 
strategies because they are assumed to improve the substantive quality of decisions 
and policy making by incorporating new and more information obtained from the 
different participants; increase learning processes among the participants (educating 
the actors involved) and in this way generate new knowledge; with better 
incorporation of public values into decisions; they are supposed to resolve, contain 
or reduce conflict among competing interests and the actors involved, integrate local 
knowledge and context in decision making, hence tailoring it to local circumstances; 
they achieve cost-effectiveness; and they increase compliance via greater 
commitment to and support for the implementation of decisions.63 Existing policy 
practices are criticised for being overly rigid (rules that hold across a nation and 
nations) and for their limitations in being able to incorporate local and specific 
information in the design of solutions. 
 
As a result of this policy shift one can observe, both nationally and internationally, 
the emergence of new co-operative policy initiatives and new forms of governance, 
such as public and stakeholder participation in decision making64, voluntary 
agreements and covenants, self-regulation by companies via the introduction of 
management systems and codes of conduct65, stakeholder partnerships for the 
                                                 
63  T. Beierle and J. Cayford, Democracy in Practic, Washington: Resources for the Future, 2002; T. 
Beierle, Public Participation in Environmental Decisions: An Evaluation Framework Using 
Social Goals. Discussion paper 99-06, Resources for the Future, 1998; C. Sabel, ‘Learning by 
Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development’, in: N. Smelser and R. Swedberg, (eds.) 
(see supra n. 60), pp. 137-165; M. Dorf and C.F. Sabel (see supra n. 60), pp. 267-473; B. 
Karkkainen, A. Fung and C. F. Sabel, (see supra n. 59), pp. 692-711; S. Helper, J.P. MacDuffie 
and C.F. Sabel, ‘Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While Controlling 
Opportunism’, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 9(3) 2000, pp. 443-488; C. Coglianese 
and J. Nash, ‘Environmental Management Systems and the New Policy Agenda’, in: C. 
Coglianese, and J. Nash, (eds.), Regulating from the Inside: Can Environmental Management 
Systems achieve Policy Goals, Washington: Resources for the Future, 2001; C. Coglianese, Is 
Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy? Paper Harvard University. John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, 2002; G. Cowie and L. O’Toole, ‘Linking Stakeholder 
Participation and Environmental Decision-Making’, pp. 61-75, in: F.H. Coenen, et al., (eds.), 
Participation and the Quality of Environmental Decision-Making, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1998; B. de Sousa Santos, ‘Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre: Toward a 
Redistributive Democracy’, Politics and Society, Vol. 26 1998, pp. 461-510; G. Baiocchi, 
‘Participation, Activism and Politics. The Porto Alegre Experiment’, in: A. Fung and E.O. 
Wright, (eds.), Deepening Democracy. Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory 
Governance, London: Verso, 2003, pp. 45-76. 
64  T. Beierle and J. Cayford, Democracy in Practice, Washington: Resources for the Future, 2002; 
T. Beierle  (see supra n. 62); G. Cowie and L. O’Toole, ‘Linking Stakeholder Participation and 
Environmental Decision-making’, in: F.H. Coenen, et al., (eds.), Participation and the Quality of 
Environmental Decision-Making, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998, pp. 61-75.  
65  C. Coglianese and J. Nash, (eds.), Regulating from the Inside: Can Environmental Management 
Systems Achieve Policy Goals, Washington: Resources for the Future, 2001; K. Kollman and A. 
Prakash, ‘EMS-based Environmental Regimes as Club Goods: Examing Variations in Firm-level 
Adoption of ISO 14001 and EMAS in UK, US and Germany’, Policy Sciences, Vol. 35 2002, pp. 
43-67; I. Mamic, Implementing Codes of Conduct. How Businesses manage social performance 
 16  
management of ecosystems or the monitoring of human rights issues and labour 
conditions on a global scale66, collaborative pragmatism67, the development of 
corporate social responsibility models and the rise and proliferation of accreditation 
and certification bodies such as the Forest Stewardship Council, Fair Labour 
Association or Marine Stewardship Council.68
 
2.3. Governance and Regulation as a Multi-actor Game 
 
What has been set out above already indicates that governance, and by the same 
token regulation, has become a multi-actor game: apart from intergovernmental 
organisations, non-governmental and transnational actors are playing an increasing 
role in global governance.69 In some issue areas there is intense co-operation 
between State and non-State actors. Apart from the obvious example of the 
International Labour Organization, one could point to the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (supra, 2.1.) or to ICANN70, which governs the internet. In some areas 
States have even ceased to play a role and transnational actors have taken over. A 
prime example is the International Standardization Organization (ISO), which by now 
has produced some 13,000 rules on the standardisation of products and 
processes.71 These rules are often adopted by other international organisations, 
                                                                                                                                           
in global supply chains, Geneva: ILO, 1994; World Bank, Company Codes of Conduct and 
International Standards: An Analytical Comparison, Washington: Worldbank, 2003. 
66  W. Leach, N.W. Pelkey and P. Sabatier, ‘Stakeholder Partnerships as Collaborative Policy-
making: Evaluation Criteria Applied to Watershed Management in California and Washington’, 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 21(4) 2002, pp. 645-670. 
67  B. Karkkainen, A. Fung and C. F. Sabel, ‘(see supra n. 59), pp. 692-711; B. Karkkainen, 
‘Towards Ecologically Sustainable Democracy’, in: A. Fung and E.O. Wright, (eds.), Deepening 
Democracy. Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, London: Verso, 
2003, pp. 208-224. 
68  T. Bartley, ‘Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the Rise of Private 
Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields’, Politics and Society, Vol. 31(3) 2003, pp. 
433-464; B. Cashore, ‘Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How 
Non-state Market-driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-making Authority, 
Governance – An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 15(4) 2003, pp. 503-
529; B. Cashore, G. Auld and D. Newsom, Governing through Markets: Forest Certification and 
the Emergence of Non-State Authority, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004; D. O’Rourke, 
‘Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards and 
Monitoring’, Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 31(1) 2003, pp. 1-29. 
69  Anne-Marie Slaughter regards these networks as a better way of world governance than the 
traditional statecentric approach. See her A New World Order, 2004, Boston MA: Princeton 
University Press. Another relevant dimension is not addressed in this contribution. Apart from 
transnational networks, the international legal order is also challenged by ‘hegemonic 
international law’ (HIL). On the influence of hegemons see also J.E. Alvarez, (see supra n. 3), 
pp. 199-217 as well as G. Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the 
International Legal Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
70  Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. 
71  R.B. Hall and Th.J. Biersteker, (eds), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  2002. 
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such as the WTO, which allows them to indirectly affect national legal orders.72 A 
similar situation arises in relation to the norms set by the World Anti-Doping Agency. 
It is clear that individuals or companies may be confronted by rules that were 
adopted without any direct influence by the national legislator or that simply have to 
be adopted at the national level in order to be able to participate in international co-
operation. Something like global law without the State73 does exist and in some 
areas States do not play any role in global regulation. What one witnesses is a 
transnational co-operation that has already led to a complete set of rules on the use 
of the internet: the lex digitalis, comparable to the lex mercatoria related to 
transnational trade.74 Other examples include the Basel Committee, in which the 
central bank directors of a limited number of countries harmonise their policies in 
such a way as to result in a de facto regulation of the capital market75, and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which deals with the 
transnationalisation of securities markets and attempts to provide a regulatory 
framework for them.76 National agencies thus participate in global (or regional) 
regulatory networks as independent, autonomous actors and are, in turn, often 
required to implement international regulations or agreements adopted in the context 
of these networks at the national level.77 As early as a decade ago, Slaughter termed 
this phenomenon the “nationalization of international law”.78 According to Jayasuriya 
these new regulatory forms have three main features: 1. they are governed by 
networks of State agencies acting not on behalf of the State but as independent 
actors; 2. they lay down standards and general regulatory principles rather than strict 
rules; and 3. they frequently contribute to the emergence of a system of 
decentralised enforcement or the regulation of self-regulation.79
                                                 
72  S. Shapiro, ‘International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection and Public Accountability’, 
Administrative Law Review, 2002, p. 435. 
73  For the contribution to the fragmentation of law see Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, (see infra n. 
104), p. 1009. 
74  On the lex digitalis see for instance H.H. Perritt Jr., ‘Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand 
for New Forms of ADR’, Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 2000, pp. 675-692. On the 
lex mercatoria see for instance L.M. Friedman, ‘Erewhon: The Coming Global Legal Order’, 
Stanford Journal of International Law, 2001, pp. 347-359. 
75  D. Zaring, ‘International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial 
Regulatory Organizations’, Texas International Law Review, 1998, p. 281; M.S. Barr and G.P. 
Miller, ‘Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel’, EJIL, 2006, pp. 15-46. 
76  Ibid.; and Jayasuriya (see supra n. 3), p. 449.  
77  Jayasuriya (see supra n. 3), p. 440. See also S. Picciotto, ‘The Regulatory Criss-Cross: 
Interaction Between Jurisdictions and the Construction of Global Regulatory Networks’, in: W. 
Bratton, et al., (eds.), International Regulatory Competition and Coordination: Perspectives on 
Economic Regulation in Europe and the United States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 89-
123. 
78  A.-M. Slaughter, ‘The Real New World Order’, Foreign Affairs, 1997, pp. 183 et seq., at p. 192. 
79  Jayasuriya (see supra n. 3), p. 453. On the regulation of self-regulation in particular see G. 
Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’, Law & Society, 1983, pp. 239-
281. Elements of this development are also addressed by A.-M. Slaughter, (see supra n. 68). 
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Apart from non-governmental bodies and national agencies making their own 
international deals, a relatively new development is the proliferation of international 
bodies that are not based on an international agreement but on a decision by an 
international organisation. According to some observers these new international 
entities even outnumber the conventional organisations.80 International regulatory co-
operation is often conducted between these non-conventional international bodies.81 
The tendency towards functional specialisation because of the technical expertise 
required in many areas may be a reason for the proliferation of such bodies and for 
their interaction with other international organisations and agencies, which 
sometimes leads to the creation of common bodies, such as the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF, created by the World Bank and joined by EBDP and 
UNEP) and UNAIDS, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (instituted 
by UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCO, WHO and the World Bank).82 Whereas 
traditional international organisations are established by an agreement between 
States, in which their control over the organisation and the division of powers is laid 
down83, the link between newly created international bodies and the States that 
established the parent organisation is less clear.  In a recent study Martini points to 
fundamental sectors, such as environmental protection and public health84, where 
the Global Environmental Facility (GEF, created by the World Bank and joined by 
EBDP and UNEP) and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS, 
instituted by UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCO, WHO and the World Bank) 
“demonstrate how the entity’s will does not simply express the sum of the Member 
States’ positions, but reformulates them at a higher level of complexity, assigning 
decision-making power to different subjects, especially to the international 
                                                 
80  See the early study by C. Shanks, H.K. Jacobson and J.H. Kaplan, ‘Inertia and Change in the 
Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992’, International 
Organization, 1996, pp. 593 et seq..  
81  Cf. also C. Tietje, ‘Global Governance and Inter-Agency Cooperation in International Economic 
Law’, Journal of World Trade, 2002, p. 501. 
82  On this phenomenon of what she terms the ‘new international organization’, see in particular the 
interesting contribution by C. Martini, ‘States’ Control over New International Organization’, 
Global Jurist Advances, 2006, pp. 1-25. 
83  On the different dimensions of the relationship between states and international organizations cf. 
D. Sarooshi, (see supra n. 3). 
84  See also M. Forrest, ‘Using the Power of the World Health Organization: The International 
Health Regulations and the Future of International Health Law’, Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs., 2000 
(putting the legislative powers of the WHO into perspective); and D.P. Fodler, ‘Global 
Challenges to Public Health: SARS: The Political Pathology of the First Post-Westphalian 
Pathogen’, J. Med. & Ethics, 2004 (on the possible implications of WHO regulations for national 
sovereignty). For the environmental sector see R.R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous 
Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed 
Phenomenon in International Law’, AJIL, Vol. 4 2000, pp. 623-659. 
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institutions that promoted the establishment of the new organization.”85 Martini’s 
study reveals that the loss of States’ influence – and hence the autonomous position 
of international agencies – is reflected in at least three phenomena86: (i) the fact that 
the new entities emerge from the regular decisions of other organisations, rather 
than through the treaty-making process, compromises States’ ability to influence not 
only their creation but also their further development; (ii) States may lose some 
powers to the parent organisations, such as the power to appoint the new entity’s 
executive heads; moreover, they might have to share the power to define and 
manage the organisation’s activities; and (iii) in the non-State-created organisations 
the international secretariat plays a greater role. This is not to say that all these 
international bodies can readily be compared with each another: “In fact, these 
institutions are established in different ways, have different institutional structures 
and relationships with their parent organizations, and different areas of activity and 
functions”.87 However, the need for collaboration between international agencies and 
the subsequent creation of common organisations has resulted in a global regulatory 
sphere in which States are more often confronted with a decrease in the influence 
they have on global normative processes.  
 
 
3. THE RESPONSE FROM THE LEGAL COMMUNITY 
 
Legal studies have only recently started to recognise the phenomena described 
above. After all, the international legal system is formed on the basis of legally 
autonomous national legal orders, which are in principle exclusively competent to 
create, implement and enforce legal norms.  Nevertheless, an increasing number of 
studies depart from the notion that the national legal order is part of a multilevel 
international legal order and that the creation, application and interpretation of 
national as well as international norms should take account of the multilevel structure 
of the system. With the development of the international legal order we have grown 
accustomed to legal norms being developed outside the national legal orders. The 
proliferation of rule makers at the international level poses new challenges to the 
coherence of this order. While treaties and custom remain the primary sources of 
international law, we have seen above that decisions of international organisations 
are playing an ever larger part in the development of international law. As national 
governments have become increasingly dependent on international institutions, a 
                                                 
85  Martini, op.cit., p. 25. 
86  Ibid., p. 24. 
87  Ibid., p. 2. 
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large part of national policy is influenced by and depends on international decisions. 
Although States do not cease to exist by becoming a member of an international 
(integration) organisation, it becomes very difficult to regard their national legal order 
as existing in complete isolation from the legal system of the organisation. The 
‘constitutional setting’ in which they operate may depend in large part on general 
international law, and at least clearly includes the arrangements to which they 
agreed in the context of the international organisation in question. Conversely, the 
international organisation has to deal with the Janus-faced identity of Member 
States: on the one hand Member States are an integral part of the international 
organisation they set up among themselves; on the other hand the States are the 
counterparts of the same international organisation, in the sense that both occupy 
independent positions within the international legal order and even have obligations 
towards each other. 
 
The legal community has developed a variety of approaches to deal with this 





The combination of the phenomenon of multilevel governance and the related 
declining ability of States to achieve the realisation of human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and democratic procedures, has led a number of legal scholars to view 
constitutionalism in multilevel terms. On the one hand it is assumed that globalisation 
may strengthen the protection of fundamental values at the national level, e.g. 
through a constitutionalisation of human rights (as experienced for instance in 
Europe with the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and the extensive case law of the European Court of Human Rights). On 
the other hand, global processes may undermine these values, as a result, for 
instance of the limited (democratic or otherwise) legitimacy of international 
decisions89 and deficits in accountability, the rule of law (e.g. the lack of a possibility 
                                                 
88  Interestingly, almost all the legal scholars in question have a background in international law. 
Scholars active in the areas of constitutional law and legal theory seem to be more prone to adopt 
a comparative approach, continuing to see the State as the central reality and not really focussing 
on normative processes in the international legal order. See e.g. W. Twining, Globalization and 
Legal Theory, 2000, Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press. An author who does pay 
attention to developments at the global level is B. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, 
Politics, Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
89  See also M. Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist 
Framework of Analysis’, EJIL, Vol. 5 2004, pp. 907-931. On a number of these 
issues see also J.-M. Coicaud and V. Heiskanen, (eds.), The Legitimacy of 
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for review by an independent judiciary90) and transparency. In the words of 
Petersmann, “the inevitable ‘democratic deficit’ of worldwide organisations for the 
collective supply of ‘global public goods’ must be compensated for by subjecting their 
multilevel governance to multilevel constitutional restraints at both international and 
domestic levels.”91 While the trend towards approaching international organisations 
from a constitutional perspective started in relation to the European Union92, other 
international organisations have become subject to academic constitutional scrutiny 
as well.93 In fact, as one observer holds: “If anyone were to propose a pairing of 
phrases to characterize current developments in international law, the smart money 
would surely be on constitutionalisation and fragmentation. [M]any international 
                                                                                                                                           
International Organizations, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001. 
Already a classic is E. Stein, ‘International Integration and Democracy: No Love 
at First Sight’, AJIL, 2001, pp. 489-534. See also S. Wheatley, ‘Democratic 
Governance Beyond the State: The Legitimacy of Non-State Actors as Standard 
Setters’, in: The Role of Non-State Actors in Standard Setting, Basel Institute on 
Governance (forthcoming, 2008).  
90  See, e.g., on the problems related to judicial review of UN Security Council decisions, E. de Wet, 
The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005; 
K. Manusama, The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era: Applying the Principle of Legality, 
Leiden: Nijhoff, 2006. 
91  E.-U. Petersmann, ‘Multilevel Trade Governance in the WTO Requires 
Multilevel Constitutionalism’, in: C. Joerges and E.-U. Petersmann, (eds.), 
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation, Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2006; J.P. Trachtman, ‘The World Trading System, the 
International Legal System and Multilevel Choice’, ELJ, 2006, p. 469; and R. 
Uerpmann-Wittzack, ‘The Constitutional Role of Multilateral Treaty Systems’, 
in: A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast, Principles of European Constitutional Law, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006, pp. 145-181. See also I. Pernice, ‘Multilevel 
Constitutionalism in the European Union’, European Law Review, 2002, pp. 
511-529; and R.A. Wessel, ‘The Multilevel Constitution of European Foreign 
Relations’, in: N. Tsagourias, (ed.), Transnational Constitutionalism: 
International and European Perspectives, Cambridge: University Press, 2007. 
92  See for instance G. Frankenberg, ‘The Return of the Contract: Problems and Pitfalls of European 
Constitutionalism’, ELJ Vol. 3 2000, pp. 257-76; J. Schwartze, (ed.), The Birth of a European 
Constitutional Order: The Interaction of National and European Constitutional Law, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2001; A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast, (eds.), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006; J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
93  See for instance E.-U. Petersmann, ‘Constitutionalism and International Organisations’, 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 1996, p. 398; as well as his ‘Human 
Rights, Constitutionalism and the World Trade Organization: Challenges for World Trade 
Organization Jurisprudence and Civil Society’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 2006, pp. 
633-667; D.Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the WTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005 (claiming, however, that the WTO is not and should not be constitutionalised); B. 
Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’, Col. 
J. Tran’l L., Vol. 36 1998, pp. 529 et seq.; and his ‘The Meaning of International Constitutional 
Law’, in: R. St. MacDonald and D.M. Johnston, (see supra n. 26), p. 837. 
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lawyers propose that treaty regimes be constitutionalized, and voice such proposals 
in particular in the context of international organizations”.94
 
Important parts of the changing nature of the international legal order are studied in 
what is frequently referred to as ‘international constitutional law’.95 One of the 
questions in international constitutional law is whether a so-called domestic 
analogy96 is useful and to what extent one has to take account of the fact that global 
governance acknowledges no single government97 but rather numerous different 
actors at various levels, all in their own manner influencing policy making and, for our 
purpose, rule making through complex, often interrelated processes.  
 
3.2. Global Administrative Law 
 
Another manner in which global governance and regulation is being tackled by legal 
scholarship is the so-called ‘global administrative law’ approach. The term was 
introduced by Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart when they launched a project under 
this title at New York University. They define global administrative law as “comprising 
the structures, procedures and normative standards for regulatory decision-making, 
including transparency, participation, and review, and the rule-governed mechanisms 
for implementing these standards, that are applicable to formal intergovernmental 
regulatory bodies; to informal intergovernmental regulatory networks; to regulatory 
decisions of national governments where these are part of or constrained by an 
intergovernmental regime; and to hybrid public-private or private transnational 
                                                 
94  J. Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’, International Organizations Law Review, 2004, pp. 31-58, 
who also points to some of the inherent paradoxes of  constitutionalism. 
95  E. de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’, ICLQ, 2006, pp. 51-76; R. St. MacDonald 
and D.M. Johnston, (see supra n. 26); N. Tsagourias, (see supra n. 90); B. Ackerman, ‘The Rise 
of World Constitutionalism’, Virginia Law Review, 1997, p. 771; S. Kadelbach and Th. 
Kleinlein, ‘Überstaatliches Verfassungsrecht: Zur Konstitutionalisierung im Völkerrecht’ 
[Supranational Constitutional Law: On the Constitutionalisation of International Law], Archiv 
des Völkerrechts, 2006, pp. 235-266. For an earlier reference see A. Verdross, Die Verfassung 
der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft, Vienna: Springer Verlag, 1926. For a (US) critique: E.A. Young, 
‘The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism’, Texas International Law Journal, 2003, p. 527. 
96  As for instance propagated by R.B. Stewart, ‘U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global 
Administrative Law’, IILJ Working Paper, Vol. 7 2005, available at http://www.iilj.org. In this 
contribution we leave aside the consequences of globalization for national administrative law as a 
result of the changing role of the State due to both the increasing interplay between national and 
international law and between the public and private sector. On this topic see for instance: A.C. 
Aman, Administrative Law in a Global Context, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992; A.C. 
Aman, “Administrative Law for a New Century”, in: M. Taggert, (ed.), TheProvince of 
Administrative Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997; and J. Delbrück, Globalization of Law, 
Politics and Markets – Implications for Domestic Law – A European Perspective”, Ind. J. Global 
Legal Studies, 1993, p. 9. For the consequences of the constitutional order of (in this case) the 
United States: M. Tushnet, TheNew Constitutional Order, 2003, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, Ch. 5: Globalization and the New Constitutional Order. 
97  The discussion on global governance does, however, fuel the older debate on a possible world 
government. See recently for instance B.S. Chimni, ‘International Institutions Today: An 
Imperial Global State in the Making’, EJIL, 2004, pp. 1-37. 
 23  
bodies.”98 The focus in the global administrative law project is on the administrative 
components and functions of international and transnational regulatory regimes. At 
the same time, however, quite a broad scope is adopted as “much of global 
governance can be understood and analyzed as administrative action: rule making, 
administrative adjudication between competing interests, and other forms of 
regulatory and administrative decisions and management.”99 The project thus 
addresses many of the questions posed in the present contribution with a view to a 
possible emergence of global administrative law. In doing so, many contributions 
focus on specific regulatory regimes, ranging from the OECD to accounting, the 
global garment industry, investment treaty arbitration, procurement rules, urban 
water service delivery, development co-operation, the environment, or the 
UNHCR.100 At the same time, contributions draw a comparison with domestic 
administrative law systems.101 The domestic analogy flows from the fact that the “real 
addressees of […] global regulatory regimes are now increasingly the same as in 
domestic law: namely, individuals […], and collective entities in regulated spheres 
including corporations and in some cases NGOs”.102 This calls for the recognition of 
a global administrative space in which international and transnational administrative 
bodies interact in complex ways. The notion that this global administrative space can 
be distinguished from both the space of inter-state relations governed by 
international law and from the domestic regulatory space governed by domestic 
administrative law is underlined by the findings in the present contribution in relation 
                                                 
98  B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R.B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, IILJ 
Working Paper, Vol. 1 2004, available at http://www.iilj.org/global_adlaw/, p. 5; also published 
in Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 3 & 4 2005, pp. 15-62. 
99  Ibid., p. 5. 
100  For an extensive overview see the Global Administrative Law Bibliography available at 
http://www.iilj.org/global_adlaw/ as well as the special issues of the EJIL on Global Governance 
and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, Vol. 1 2006; Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 3 & 4 2005; and the NYU Journal of International law and 
Politics, No. 4. 2005. For the relevance to environmental law see: D.-Th. Avgerinopoulou, ‘The 
Rise of Global Environmental Administrative Law – Improving Implementation and Compliance 
through the Means of Global Governance’, Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE), 9-15 April 2005, Marrakech, Morocco, 
available at http://www.inece.org/ conference/7/vol1/21_Avgerinopoulou.pdf. 
101  See for instance R.B. Stewart, ‘U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative 
Law’, IILJ Working Paper 2005/7, available at http://www.iilj.org/global_adlaw/. In this 
contribution we leave aside the consequences of globalisation for national administrative law as a 
result of the changing role of the State due to both the increasing interplay between national and 
international law and between the public and private sector. On this topic see for instance: A.C. 
Aman, Administrative Law in a Global Context, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992; A.C. 
Aman, ‘Administrative Law for a New Century’, in: M. Taggert, (ed.), The Province of 
Administrative Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997; and J. Delbrück, ‘Globalization of Law, 
Politics and Markets – Implications for Domestic Law – A European Perspective’, Ind. J. Global 
Legal Studies, 1993, p. 9. For the consequences of the constitutional order of (in this case) the 
United States: M. Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order, 2003, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, Ch. 5: Globalization and the New Constitutional Order. 
102  B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R.B. Stewart, (see supra n. 97), p. 10. 
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to multilevel regulation. In fact, one may state that nowadays the term ‘global law’ 





The discussions of the ‘fragmentation of international law’ took a high flight at the 
end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. The International Law 
Commission considered the issue serious enough to be taken up and its study group 
dealing with this matter recently issued a report on the matter.104 A great variety of 
scholars have meanwhile written on the phenomenon of the fragmentation of 
international law.105 The name refers to the increasing multitude of regulatory 
regimes and international dispute settlement systems, the jurisdiction of which may 
be partly overlapping or at least in conflict with other specialized fields of 
                                                 
103  Cf. also D. Lewis, (ed.), Global Governance and the Quest of Justice. Volume I: International 
and Regional Organizations, Oxford: Hart  Publishers, 2006. That this could also be seen as a 
step towards a ‘world government’ was recently argued by B.S. Chimni, (see supra n. 96). 
104  Report of the Work of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, 18 July 2006. 
105  The literature on this subject abounds. See inter alia Canadian Council on International Law, 
Fragmentation: Diversification and Expansion of International Law : Proceedings of the 34th 
Annual Conference of the Canadian Council of International Law, Ottawa, Canadian Council on 
International Law 2006; M. Craven, ‘Unity, Diversity and Fragmentation of International Law’, 
The Finnish Yearbook of International Law, 2003, pp. 3-34; A. Del Vecchio, Giurisdizione 
internazionale e globalizzazione: i tribunali internazionali tra globalizzazione e frammentazione, 
Milan, Giuffrè, 2003; A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: the Vain Search 
for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 
2004, pp. 999-1046; A. Gattini, ‘Un regard procédural sur la fragmentation du droit 
international’, Revue générale de droit international publique, 2006, pp. 303-336; G. Hafner, 
‘Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law’, Michigan Journal of 
International Law, 2004, pp. 849-863; R. Huese Vinaixa and K. Wellens, (eds.), L’influence des 
sources sur l’unité et la fragmentation du droit international, Brussels, Bruylant, 2006; M. 
Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 2002, pp. 553-579; J. Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: 
International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands’, Michigan Journal of International 
Law, 2004, pp. 903-916; E.-U. Petersmann, ‘Justice as Conflict Resolution: Proliferation, 
Fragmentation and Decentralisation of Dispute Settlement in International Trade Law’, 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, 2006, pp. 273-366; M. Prost 
and P. Kingsley Clark, ‘Unity, Diversity and Fragmentation of International Law: How Much 
Does the Multiplication of International Organizations Really Matter?’, Chinese Journal of 
International Law, 2006, pp. 641-370; P. Rao, ‘Multiple International Judicial Forums: A 
Reflection of the Growing Strength of International Law or its Fragmentation’, Michigan Journal 
of International Law, 2004, pp. 929-961; S. Salinas Alcega and C. Tirado Robles, (eds.), 
Adaptabilidad y Fragmentacion del Derecho Internacional: la Crisis da la Sectorialización, 
Zaragoza, Real Instituto de Estudios Europeos, 1999; B. Simma, ‘Fragmentation in a Positive 
Light’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 2004, pp. 849-863; T. Stephens, ‘Multiple 
International Courts and the “Fragmentation of International Environmental Law”, Australian 
Yearbook of International Law, 2004, pp. 227-271; T. Treves, ‘Judicial Law-Making in an Era of 
“Proliferation” of International Courts and Tribunals: Development or Fragmentation of 
International Law?’, in: R. Wolfrum and V. Röben, pp. 587-620; K. Wellens, ‘Fragmentation of 
International Law and Establishing an Accountability Regime for International Organizations: 
the Role of the Judiciary in Closing the Gap’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 2004, pp. 
1159-1181.  
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international law and policy. Although the notion of fragmentation is also closely 
connected to an international regulatory order in which “an ever-increasing number 
of regulatory institutions with overlapping jurisdictions compete for influence”,106 the 
scholarly research on this phenomenon is mainly conducted at a horizontal and 
global level. The fragmentation debate focuses on possible or real inconsistencies 
and conflicts between the various international regulatory regimes and dispute 
settlement mechanisms. It does not therefore specifically consider the legal and 
political consequences of multilevel governance and regulatory activities, as is the 
case in this contribution.  
 
This having been said, the fragmentation debate provides us with valuable insights 
as far as the problem of conflicting norms is concerned. The aforementioned report 
of the study group on fragmentation of the International Law Commission addresses 
this problem, which it sees as a normal result of the development of “new rules and 
legal regimes as responses to new preferences, and sometimes out of conscious 
effort to deviate from preferences that existed under old regimes”.107 One of the 
general conclusions of the report is that there is “no homogenous, hierarchical meta-
system realistically available to do away with such problems [of coordination at the 
international level]”.108 Therefore, “increasing attention will have to be given to the 
collision of norms and regimes and the rules, methods and techniques for dealing 
with such collisions”.109 The report notes that further attention needs to be paid to 
these methods and techniques. The use of conflict clauses may be one technique, 
but these clauses are often unclear and ambivalent. Furthermore, conflict rules like 
lex posterior and lex specialis may need further study and may be insufficiently 
sophisticated to address the conflicts that can occur in the present international legal 
order.110
 
If the ordinary conflict rules are already inadequate in the present international legal 
order, this applies a fortiori to multilevel regulation: the rules of international treaty 
law on the relationship between various treaties are not adjusted to the complex 
                                                 
106  E. Benvenisti and G.W. Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the 
Fragmentation of International Law’, Stanford Law Review, 2007 (forthcoming, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract =976930). 
107  Report of the Work of the Study Group of the International Law Commission,  para. 484. 
108  Ibid., para. 493. 
109  Ibid. 
110  For an illustration, examining the compatibility between WTO law and the new Unesco 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, see J. 
Wouters and B. De Meester, ‘The Unesco Convention on Cultural Diversity and WTO Law: A 
Case-Study in Fragmentation of International Law’, forthcoming in: Journal of World Trade, 
Vol. 42(1) 2008. 
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interactions between global, macro-regional and domestic legal systems. Rather, 
one could hold with Fischer-Lescano and Teubner that 
 
“[…] the unity of global law is no longer structure-based, as in the case of the Nation-State, within 
institutionally secured normative consistency; but is rather process-based, deriving simply from the 




4.  AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 
 
The phenomenon of multilevel regulation has thus been approached from a variety 
of angles, using a variety of concepts and terms. The ‘invasion by international 
organizations’ raises a number of new research questions which go beyond the law 
of international organizations itself and include EU and national law. It is above all 
the interplay between the legal orders that causes legal research to re-assess 
classic notions surrounding the hierarchy of norms, legal protection, judicial interplay 
and the normative force of international decisions. In doing so, legal scholars 
increasingly make use of notions and insights that were developed in other academic 
disciplines, notably political science and public administration. Below we have made 
an attempt to list some of the approaches which seem relevant in setting up an 
agenda for research related to the consequences of multilevel regulation. 
 
4.1. Combining Different Legal Perspectives: Accountability, 
Democracy, Legitimacy, Rule of Law 
 
An interesting contribution to the study of multilevel regulation, in line with the global 
administrative law project outlined above (supra, 3.2.), could be the emphasis on the 
need to rethink domestically based notions of democracy, legitimacy and the rule of 
law. After all, “[e]very European system acknowledges the primary function of 
administrative law as being the control of public power”,112 or “bounded 
government”.113 Harlow lists a number of principles as forming the basis for 
administrative law: accountability, transparency and access to information, 
participation, the right of access to an independent court, due process rights, 
including the right to be heard and the right to reasoned decisions and 
reasonableness. European legal systems have added proportionality and legitimate 
                                                 
111  A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law,’ Michigan Journal of International Law, 2004, pp. 999-1046. 
112  C. Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’, EJIL, 2006, pp. 
187-214, at p. 191. 
113  M. Shapiro, ‘Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections of Government and Governance’, Ind. 
J. Global Legal Studies, 2001, pp. 369-377. 
 27  
expectations to this list. This calls for a linking of procedural and substantive 
norms.114
 
We submit that a further conceptual refinement and extensive comparative research 
into these concepts and principles should be high on the research agenda. In this 
context, it is particularly the subject of accountability that seems to us to be of major 
importance, since it feeds back into issues of legitimacy and democracy.115 Little is 
known about accountability systems in international organisations and the similarities 
and differences between international organisations inter se and between them and 
national agencies.116 Even less research has been conducted on accountability in 
other international bodies and forums. Especially crucial issues – such as control 
over executive decisions, leadership selection mechanisms, control over the 
formulation of strategic and operational goals of international organizations and 
control over standard-setting competences – are in need of further investigation and 
analysis. With regard to the latter, more research should be devoted to the question 
of what regulatory standards should be focused on by different levels of governance 
and actors in the policy arena (standards of physical design, standards of 
performance or organisational decision procedures).  
 
The aforementioned research, albeit legal in nature, can contribute to a more 
comprehensive analysis of the quality of regulatory work by international 
organisations and bodies (including the use of regulatory tools designed to achieve 
better regulation, such as regulatory impact assessments) and an assessment of the 
concept of (international) rule precision. Colin S. Diver117 distinguished three qualities 
of regulatory rules, namely transparency, accessibility and congruence, and has 
developed criteria to determine the appropriate degree of regulatory precision. An 
assessment of international rules from this perspective could contribute to a better 
understanding of the impact of international rules on lower levels of regulation. 
                                                 
114  Arguments against decoupling institutional, procedural, law from substantive law may for 
instance be found in B.S. Chimni, ‘Cooption and Resistance: Two Faces of Global 
Administrative Law’, IILJ Working Paper 2005/16, available at http://www/iilj.org. 
115  C. Graham, ‘Is there a Crisis in Regulatory Accountability’, in: R. Baldwin, et al., (eds.), A 
Reader on Regulation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 482-522. 
116  With regard to the EU see D. Curtin, ‘Holding (Quasi-) Autonomous EU Administrative Actors 
to Public Account’, European Law Journal, 2007, pp. 523-541. 
117  C. Diver, ‘The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules’, in, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 93 1983, 
pp. 65-109. 
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4.2. A Public Policy Perspective on Multilevel Regulation 
 
A second set of questions that is assuming increasing importance with regard to 
multilevel regulation concerns the evaluation of these multilevel regulatory 
interventions from a public policy perspective.118 In assessing multilevel regulation 
from a public policy perspective, several theoretical arguments have been developed 
related to its possible benefits and drawbacks. Many of these arguments need 
further investigation. For example, some authors argue that dispersion of 
governance and regulatory practices across multiple jurisdictions is more flexible 
than the concentration of governance in one jurisdiction. This allows decision makers 
to adjust to diversity, reflect heterogeneity and stimulate competitive standard-setting 
dynamics.119 These arguments are closely related to the evolution from government 
to governance discussed above (supra, 2.2.). Identified drawbacks of multilevel 
regulation include incomplete information, inter-jurisdictional co-ordination, interest-
group capture and corruption due to ineffective systems of checks and balances.120 
Most of these arguments about the drawbacks and benefits are, however, more 
hypotheses than established facts. Hence, more empirical research should focus on 
whether these claims are valid and, if so, under what conditions. Much of this 
research can build on existing studies that focus on intra-state dynamics or intra-
regional dynamics with regard to regulation. Let us briefly explore each aspect.  
 
4.3. Rule Dynamics, Co-ordination and Co-operation in Multilevel 
Regulation 
 
First, with regard to the issue of the beneficial consequences of flexibility and 
competitive dynamics in regulatory standard setting, research can build on existing 
studies that focus on lowest common denominator outcomes in collaborative 
standard setting. Some authors, in the context of international environmental policy 
making, have argued that the fears of lowest common denominator outcomes (‘race 
to the bottom’) are sometimes unwarranted in international collaborative standard 
setting and that under certain conditions a ‘race to the top’ can occur.121 In this 
                                                 
118  E. Ostrom, ‘Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework’, in: P. Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1999, pp. 35-72. 
119  L. Hooghe and G. Marks, ‘Unraveling the Central State but How? Types of Multilevel 
Governance’, in: American Political Science Review, Vol. 97(2) 2003, pp. 233-243, especially 
pp. 235-236. 
120  Ibid., especially p. 236. 
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context, other authors have pointed to the problem of being stuck at the bottom and 
the inability and/or reluctance of weak actors to participate in dynamic, co-operative 
standard setting initiatives.122 Most research in this context has been conducted on 
environmental or pollution control standards.123 This line of research can be 
extended to other areas, including pharmaceuticals, banking and aviation.124 
Additional research should focus more on the dynamics of multilevel regulation at the 
international and national levels. A dynamic research perspective on standard setting 
should focus on questions related to the emergence of new rules (lowest common 
denominators), the development of new and existing related rules (convergence 
versus divergence; upward or downward dynamics) and the impact of these rules 
(implementation and effectiveness of rules). 
 
Secondly, with regard to possible drawbacks, several issues need further 
investigation. The issues of imperfect information and inter-jurisdictional co-
ordination are best placed in the overall context of co-ordination and co-operation 
problems in policy making. With regard to co-ordination problems, game theorists, 
institutional economists and political scientists have devoted much attention to the 
issue (and sometimes dilemma of) co-ordination.125 Multilevel regulation further 
extends and complicates this issue. As Hooghe and Marks observe, the co-
ordination and transaction costs increase exponentially as the number of relevant 
jurisdictions increases.126 Several strategies can be followed to deal with the problem 
of co-ordination. The most prominent one is to limit the number of autonomous 
actors who have to be co-ordinated.127 Reducing the number of actors can be done 
via pooling actors in core groups or by excluding actors from negotiations on rules. 
The first is increasingly happening and research should focus on the issue of 
international core group formation,128 comparing different multilevel policy arenas in 
this respect.  
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The latter strategy – excluding actors – can generate problems of co-operation. In 
his classic work “Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organisations and States”, Hirschman introduced two types of responses or 
strategies related to problems arising in collaborative settings, namely exit or voice. 
Exit occurs when an actor’s response to problems with other actors is to withdraw. 
Voice occurs when an actor’s response to problems with other actors is to work with 
the other actors until the problem is corrected. An interesting question about 
multilevel regulation is which strategy is used by actors in different multilevel policy 
arenas. Secondly, research can focus on explaining differences in the use of these 
strategies. Especially interesting in this context is linking the use of strategies to the 
design of multilevel governance institutions with regard to the design of co-ordination 
procedures. For example, in the context of international automobile firms, Helper 
found that firms used different strategies (exit/voice) towards suppliers (other actors). 
This was partially explained by the degree of administrative co-ordination that 
existed between parties. Administrative co-ordination, in essence, referred to the 
nature and amount of information that flowed between actors.129 As a result, 
depending on the design of co-ordination infrastructure (supra) multilevel regulation 
might nurture exit or voice strategies. In other words, the interrelated issues of co-
ordination and co-operation deserve special research attention in the context of 
multilevel governance. 
 
4.4. Accountability, Democracy and Social Justice in Multilevel 
Regulation 
 
Another set of issues, related to possible drawbacks of multilevel regulation, draws 
attention to issues related to accountability; and ultimately democracy and the ability 
of States to govern according to autonomously chosen, fundamental principles of 
governance (e.g. on issues of social justice and culture).  
 
With regard to accountability, a crucial issue for research concerns the question of 
who is held responsible for actions and by whom. In a recent review article Bovens 
defined accountability as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the 
actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can 
pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences.”130 This 
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Law Journal, Vol. 13(4) 2007, pp. 447-468, at p. 450 
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definition builds on a principal-agent approach to accountability and highlights this 
important challenge to research on multilevel governance.131 In a simple principal-
agent model an agent reports directly to the principal who delegated to the agent the 
freedom to act on his/her behalf. However, as Benz, Harlow and Papadopoulos 
stress, systems of multilevel governance do not easily fit into this conceptual 
framework. “By complicating and obscuring straightforward ‘chains of delegation’ […] 
they make it hard to identify a principal.”132 The latter, the identification of principals 
in multilevel systems, constitutes a major research topic for scholars studying 
international organisations. Comparative research designs might highlight striking 
differences between and within international organisations across policy 
domains/arenas. 
 
The issue of accountability feeds into the issue of democracy and democratic control 
of multilevel governance. The issue of democracy poses another challenge: research 
needs to be conducted into the underlying models of democracy that underpin 
multilevel governance.133 It is important that this type of research focuses not only on 
a comparison of multilevel regulation arrangements vis-à-vis normative ideal types of 
democracy, but also takes into account the day-to-day reality of democracy. As 
Moravcsik argues, with regard to the democratic deficit debate in the European 
Union, purely philosophical assessments can be interesting but run the danger of 
narrowing down conceptions of democracy: 
  
“Comparisons are drawn between the EU and an ancient, Westminster-style or frankly 
utopian form of deliberative democracy. While perhaps useful for philosophical purposes, the 
use of idealistic standards no modern government can meet obscures the social context of 
contemporary European policy-making – the real-world practices of existing governments and 
the multilevel political system in which they act. This leads many analysts to overlook the 
extent to which delegation and insulation are widespread trends in modern democracies, 
which must be acknowledged on their own terms. The fact that governments delegate to 
bodies such as constitutional courts, central banks, regulatory agencies, criminal prosecutors, 




Besides models of democracy underpinning multilevel governance, a related set of 
questions points to the issue of what models of social justice and cultural diversity 
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are incorporated in international rules. In the context of social justice models it is 
important to assess whether international rulemaking follows standard economic 
optimisation rules or includes more egalitarian perspectives. The analysis of social 
justice models embedded in policy making and governance  
structures at the level of the nation State has a very long tradition.135 In the context of 
the EU, too, some attention has been paid to this topic in the context of the debate 
on the European social model. Issues of convergence or divergence between 
governance structures promoting market efficiencies vis-à-vis governance structures 
promoting social protection and equality have been analysed.136 However, less 
research is being conducted on what models of justice are incorporated, implicitly 
and explicitly,  in international rule making and what the effect is on national models 
of justice. This requires an assessment of the redistributional equity principal in 
international policy making (who pays, who gains and what compensating measures 
are in place). For example, international rules on pharmaceuticals might stipulate the 
degrees of freedom for national healthcare policies with regard to medication and in 
this way feed back into policies closely related to social protection and redistributive 
sensitivities. Finally, in a globalising context, a cultural assessment – i.e. the 
conformity of rules to general morality within different countries – becomes 
increasingly important. The late Clifford Geertz137 highlighted the importance of the 
cultural context in which rules are made and implemented. As a result, problems 




5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
The phenomenon of multilevel regulatory processes and, more particularly, the 
various interactions between global, EU and national levels of policy and rule making 
are gradually becoming recognised in both the legal and political scientific 
communities. However, knowledge remains scattered, fragmentary and in many 
cases punctual or even anecdotal. There is clearly a need for a more 
comprehensive, thorough analysis of multilevel regulation and its ramifications. In the 
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present contribution we have both tried to identify and sketch the phenomenon with a 
variety of illustrations, go through the responses of legal scholarship thus far, and set 
out an agenda for further research, including both legal and non-legal approaches. 
One thing seems certain: we are confronted with an arena with plentiful, rich themes 
for interdisciplinary research for many years to come. Faced with multilevel 
regulation, the old categories and dividing lines between international, European and 
national legal orders no longer work satisfactorily and there is a clear need to rethink 
concepts such as transparency, democratic control of regulatory power, legitimacy, 
rule of law and judicial protection of fundamental human rights in situations of 
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